INTRODUCTION
The above hypothetical is not an anomaly. Over the course of serving a decade in prison, I watched prisoners with serious medical issues have their requests for treatment denied or delayed. The types of denied or delayed care I witnessed were not cases on the outer edge of medical technology or care; the majority were deliberate or vindictive denials of care, 3 and the re- 3 The following cases are representative of the kinds of treatment (and lack thereof) that I witnessed during my prison stay. See, e.g., Gibson v. Moskowitz, 523 F.3d 657, 663 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding deliberate indifference of prison psychiatrist for failing to aid inmate, who eventually died of dehydration, where psychiatrist knew that detention room was over ninety degrees, inmate had vomited, and inmate had lost over forty pounds within three days); Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1328 (11th Cir. 2007) (dismissing on procedural grounds deliberate indifference claim against jail facility commander who refused pretrial detainee's request for medical attention after leaking amniotic fluids, and who indicated he automatically disbelieved any medical complaint by an inmate merely because "inmates had lied before"); Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 464 (5th Cir. 2006) (addressing deliberate indifference claim against prison nurse who refused to follow inmate's prescribed course of treatment even while knowing inmate had heart condition, was experiencing chest pain, and did not have prescribed heart medication); Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2005) (dismissing deliberate indifference claim against prison nurse who allegedly deprived prisoner of medication and persisted with ineffective treatment despite inmate's deteriorating condition).
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Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 46 In most cases, pauper prisoners are expected to secure medical expert evidence through the normal means of discovery. While interrogatories sometimes prove useful, prisoners often need a medical professional to examine them in order for that professional to issue an opinion on the detrimental effect of non-treatment or delayed treatment. In such cases, personal examinations coupled with depositions are the only means for a pauper prisoner to gain the evidence necessary to survive summary judgment. The problem is that pauper prisoners can rarely afford the subpoena, witness, and court reporter fees necessary to obtain such a deposition.
The solution is addressed by the IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, in which Congress authorized the "commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefore . . . ." 10 Congress also provided that "officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in such cases" and " [w] itnesses shall attend as in other cases."
11 These two provisions, in tandem, should permit indigent litigants the ability to administer depositions without the prepayment of fees.
The argument that the IFP statute provides a waiver of deposition fees is not new, and unfortunately, it has not been regarded favorably by courts. It was raised in the 1980s and early 1990s, during the zenith of frivolous prisoner litigation and prior to the passage of the PLRA. With regard to witness fees, several federal courts of appeals were asked whether the IFP statute required the government to subsidize witness fees both during discovery and at trial; every court that faced the issue concluded that it did not. 12 For the last twenty years, the argument for a different construction of the IFP statute has lain dormant, though the circuit courts' decisions have been called into question by a subsequent Supreme Court ruling, 13 and the policy considerations underlying those decisions have been ameliorated by the passage of the PLRA. In addition, the majority of courts giving the IFP statute a narrow construction failed to consider a canon of statutory construction given prominence by the Supreme Court in recent years. The doctrine of constitutional avoidance counsels against a construction of a statute that would produce serious questions of its constitutionality. This doctrine has force with regard to the IFP statute, because if indigent litigants are deprived of the means to secure the evidence needed to prove their claims, serious due process and equal protection questions arise. For these reasons, 10 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (2006) . 11 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (2006) . 12 See, e.g., Pedraza v. Jones, 7 F.3d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 1995 prisoners should argue that the IFP statute must be revisited as to witness fees. With regard to court officers' fees for depositions, there currently exists case law that supports prisoners' ability to obtain a waiver of those fees. My suggestion is for prisoners to use this body of law to advocate for a waiver of fees related to administering depositions.
In the first section of this article, I describe the history of the IFP statute and the current circuit court jurisprudence on the scope of the statute. In the second section, I explain why indigent prisoners alleging deliberate indifference claims need the ability to conduct depositions. Third, I explain the arguments prisoners should put forth as to why the IFP statute allows district courts to waive fees associated with depositions.
I. THE IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUTE
Title 28, United States Code, Section 1915, the In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") statute, enables indigent parties to file actions in federal court without prepayment of filing and related fees. The original IFP statute was enacted by Congress in 1892 14 and was based, in part, on the belief dating back to the Magna Carta that indigent individuals should not be barred from court proceedings due to a lack of financial resources. 15 Since its inception, the IFP statute has been used by scores of indigent litigants seeking justice in the federal courts and has been the primary means through which prisoners litigate violations of their constitutional rights.
Both the Congressional Record and House Report provide insight into the policies embodied in the IFP statute. Representative Culberson, a supporter of the bill, acknowledged that the effect of the bill would be to open up the courts "to a class of persons who are now denied the right of bringing suits in the courts of the United States, that have no money or property by which to comply with the rules of the courts with respect to costs." 16 The House Report states that the question before Congress was a simple one: "[w]ill the Government allow its courts to be practically closed to its own citizens, who are conceded to have valid and just rights, because they happen to be without the money to advance pay to the tribunals of justice?"
17
Congress answered the question by passing the IFP statute and noting many "enlightened States" already possessed similar IFP statutes, and that the federal government "ought to keep pace with this enlightened judgment." This newfound "enlightened judgment," however, received a stingy reception from the courts. The Supreme Court, first addressing the statute in Bradford v. Southern Railway, 19 narrowly construed the statute and held that it did not apply to appellate proceedings. Due to the Court's construction, Congress broadened the statute's scope through amendments-a course of action that continued throughout the twentieth century. In 1910, for example, Congress amended the statute to include defendants within its purview and applied it to appellate matters. 20 Congress further amended the statute in 1922 by providing that the United States would pay for printing the record for use in a Writ of Error or criminal appeal. 21 In 1944, Congress provided that the federal government would pay the transcript fees for appeals in forma pauperis. 22 And in 1959, Congress allowed indigent non-citizens the ability to proceed as paupers.
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But not every amendment broadened the scope of § 1915. Congress in 1996 added restrictions to the IFP statute through the PLRA. The PLRA requires that all incarcerated individuals must eventually pay court filing fees in full. 24 The Act also places a "three strikes" provision into the IFP statute: for every lawsuit or appeal dismissed by a judge as frivolous, one "strike" is assessed. Once three such strikes accumulate, a prisoner cannot file another lawsuit in forma pauperis and must pay the filing fee in full before a court will docket the case. 25 The only exception to the three strikes rule occurs if a prisoner is in imminent danger of serious physical injury.
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The new restrictions added to the IFP statute were welcomed by the courts. Indeed, the PLRA has withstood several constitutional challenges. 27 However, while the PLRA amendments were heralded by Congress and upheld by the courts, scholars have noted that these new statutory provisions place significant burdens on prisoners earning little to no money while incarcerated. 33 While those courts discussed process at the inception of a suit, none discussed whether service is compulsory when an indigent plaintiff requests service of a subpoena for a deposition.
As noted above, every court to address whether the IFP statute provides a waiver of witness fees has answered in the negative. 34 Although the circuits addressing whether the IFP statute waives witness fees have been unanimous in result, their reasoning has not always been uniform. For example, in U.S. Marshals Service v. Means, the Eighth Circuit en banc sought to rely upon the plain language of § 1915(d) as a basis for finding no waiver of witness fees and expenses. 35 But when that inquiry proved inconclusive, the Means court examined the legislative history, which it found did not address the issue, and held that absent a "clear statement," the court could not "infer congressional intent to have section 1915 cover witness fees and expenses." 36 The Means court further found that the statutory structure supported its construction. The court noted that § 1915 was enacted as a whole in 1948, and thus, it had to be interpreted "as a whole." 37 Since § 1915(b) included specific language providing for government payment of certain expenses, and § 1919(d) did not, the court concluded that under the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, 38 the specific government funding provisions con- Other circuits relied on both Means and Hubbard in concluding that district courts have no authority under the IFP statute to waive payment of witness fees for an indigent litigant. 43 These decisions rarely included indepth analysis and none delved into the statutory language. Rather, the circuits' decisions as a whole focused on the policy concern that a different construction of the IFP would lead to the waste of resources on frivolous prison litigation.
II. INDIGENT PRISONERS ARE UNABLE TO SUCCEED ON DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE CLAIMS WITHOUT A DEPOSITION
Although the Eighth Amendment affords prisoners some form of relief from individuals who either fail to treat or delay the prisoner's treatment, it is well established that the bar is set relatively high for a prisoner accusing prison officials of such a violation. To prove that prison officials have displayed "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners," 44 a prisoner must satisfy both an objective and a subjective component. The objective component requires a prisoner to demonstrate that the deprivation is "sufficiently serious"; 45 in this context, a "serious medical need" is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one so obvious that even a lay person would understand the need for a doctor's attention. 46 The subjective component requires a prisoner to demonstrate that prison officials acted with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind,"
47 that offi- cials must "both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists," and "must also draw the inference." 48 Prisoners are not, however, required to show that the officials intended for the harm to occur. Indeed, "a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious." 49 When it comes to such nuanced legal issues as deliberate indifference, "[e]ven a relatively sophisticated [prison] litigant may find it difficult to identify and present the right type of evidence."
50 It is therefore imperative that pauper prisoners have access to verified medical evidence if they are to be successful in substantiating their claims.
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To bring a successful claim, pauper prisoners must first obtain evidence from a qualified medical expert that satisfies the two elements defined above. To accomplish this difficult task, the prisoner is commonly required to demonstrate that the attending physicians were wrong in their assessment of how to treat the injury, 52 that the physician knew they were wrong, 53 and that they continued the course of treatment knowing that their failure to provide appropriate treatment would cause severe pain or additional harm.
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The Eighth Amendment standards in the deliberate indifference context are often highly dependent on technical medical questions that cannot be answered objectively without the benefit of verified medical evidence. 55 Because the prison litigant's claims will often be contradicted by the defendants themselves, 56 prisoners will normally be called on to answer such questions 48 as whether the defendant physicians knowingly departed "from accepted professional judgment, practices or standards." 57 Without an opportunity for the prisoner to have an independent examination by a disinterested physician, making such a showing becomes an impossible feat. Securing the necessary evidence can only be accomplished by deposing a physician who is not employed by the defense.
58 This is necessary because courts are generally reluctant to second-guess the medical positions of the defendants and their experts without contrary medical evidence supporting the prisoner's claims. 59 Proving that a particular course of treatment conforms to accepted professional standards or whether the degree of pain experienced as a result of delayed treatment is typical or atypical are matters solely within the purview of medical professionals. The usual treatments for a given condition, the risks associated with delaying treatment, and the standard course of medical treatment for a similarly situated patient are all common issues that arise in these types of cases. 60 However, the majority of deliberate indifference claims tend to fail when it comes to proving just these points.
The reason these claims typically fail is because indigent prisoners cannot obtain the necessary evidence. Obviously, indigent prisoners cannot conduct a deposition on their own; their only chance is to request an examination and deposition from a medical professional not associated with the prison. But discovery requests come with a price. In order to conduct a deposition, litigants must provide fees to request the presence of witnesses, subpoena those witnesses, and have a court reporter transcribe the deposition volved in providing direct care to the Plaintiff attests that [ ). The trial court in this case had denied a pro se prisoner's request for a medical expert pending determination of prisoner's final course of treatment for Hepatitis C. Id. at 437. The court later awarded summary judgment to the defendant physician, who had testified that the prisoner's disease was unlikely to progress in ten to twenty years. Id. The court found that the prisoner had failed to proffer sufficient evidence demonstrating a detrimental effect as a result of any testing or treatment delays that could rebut the defendant doctor's testimony as to the prisoner's prognosis. Id. at 439. The denial and summary judgment were upheld on appeal. prisoner Laughlin believed he was experiencing a heart attack and pressed the emergency call button in his cell at 7:30 a.m. 67 When no one responded, he pressed the button again and a prison guard came, albeit twenty minutes later. Laughlin informed the guard that he was having a heart attack, and another guard arrived at the cell twenty minutes later. Laughlin told the second guard that he was experiencing a heart attack, and medical personnel arrived after another delay of fifteen minutes. He was then taken to a medical unit, and there, despite his claims, Laughlin was treated by a physician with an over-the-counter antacid and returned to his cell. 68 At 2:43 p.m., medical personnel again responded to Laughlin's cell, where he continued to complain of a heart attack. He was later admitted into the prison infirmary and the next day transported to an outside hospital, where he was diagnosed with having had a heart attack. 69 A week later, he received an angioplasty. Laughlin later alleged that the prison staff's delay in treating his heart attack constituted deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The Eighth Circuit began its discussion by noting that, when a prisoner alleges that delayed medical care violates his Eighth Amendment rights, he must place "verifying medical evidence in the record to establish detrimental effect" of the delay. 70 The court concluded that while Laughlin submitted sufficient evidence documenting the delay, ultimate diagnosis, and subsequent treatment, Laughlin had "offered no evidence establishing that any delay in 61 Congress provided "fees" for any witness "before any person authorized to take his deposition." 28 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1) (2006) . Congress specifically mandated the U.S. Marshals to routinely collect "fees" for service of process. 28 U.S.C. § 1921 (2006). Likewise, Congress allowed court reporters to collect "fees" for transcripts. 28 U.S.C. § 753(f) (2006 The court therefore granted summary judgment to the prisoner defendants. Why did Laughlin not place verifying medical evidence in the record? The answer, while not stated in the opinion, is not difficult to surmise. It is highly unlikely that he could afford the costs of deposing a doctor not associated with the prison. The construction of the IFP statute that I advocate below would allow a district court to waive the fees associated with conducting depositions for cases such as Laughlin, where the indigent prisoner has no other means to access verifying evidence and that evidence is dispositive as to summary judgment.
Would my construction of the IFP statute have made a difference in Laughlin? It is impossible to know, because Laughlin likely could not afford an independent expert evaluation. However, medical studies have found that delayed treatment for heart attacks is associated with worse outcomes.
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Unfortunately, the Laughlin decision is not an outlier. As noted above, prisoners are often required to establish through "verifying evidence" that prison staff continued the course of treatment knowing that their failure to provide adequate treatment would cause severe pain or cause additional harm. 73 In this context, it is hard to imagine many instances where a pauper prisoner can successfully provide sufficient verifying evidence without the benefit of deposing a medical professional intimately familiar with the medical aspects of the case.
74 This is just one instance where denying an indigent prisoner the means to obtain evidence seals the fate of his chance for constitutional vindication. Although the portions of the IFP statute that use the word "shall" are mandatory, the use of the word "may" in § 1915(a)(1) means simply permissible. The statute states that courts "may" authorize the "commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefore . . . ." 76 The question is whether this permissible language allows a court to waive fees associated with depositions for indigent litigants.
III. THE IFP STATUTE AUTHORIZES
The interpretation of a statute must begin, of course, with its statutory language. 77 If unambiguous, the statute's language is ordinarily to be regarded as conclusive in the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary. 78 There are, nevertheless, additional factors that typically assist courts in determining a "statute's objective and thereby illuminat[ing] its text." 79 These factors include statutory structure, purpose, context, and history. 80 All of these factors point towards the construction allowing indigent litigants to conduct depositions without the payment of related witness, court reporter, or subpoena fees.
To begin, there is no indication that Congress intended any meaning other than the common one of the terms in § 1915(a)(1). This silence compels courts to "start with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used." 81 The statutory language of § 1915(a)(1) is "broad in its application and reach." 82 It allows courts to authorize paupers to commence, prosecute, or defend any civil or criminal suit, action, proceeding or appeal without the prepayment of fees. Based upon this language, there is little reason to think that Congress did not intend for it to cover civil depositions.
For example, the ordinary meaning of prosecution is "the carrying out of a plan, project, or course of action to or toward a specific end," 83 or 84 Thus, a pauper may follow to the end or carry out any civil suit, action or proceeding. In turn, "proceeding" undoubtedly includes the event of a civil deposition because the common meaning of "proceeding" is "the course of procedure in a judicial action or in a suit in litigation" 85 or "[t]he regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including all acts and events between the time of commencement and the entry of judgment." 86 Finally, the term "fees" in § 1915(a)(1) must encompass witness, service, and court reporter fees since such fees are "a charge fixed by law for certain privileges or services." 87 The natural and plain reading of § 1915(a)(1) therefore allows courts to waive witness, service, and court reporter fees for indigent litigants prosecuting a civil proceeding.
This construction accords with Congress' use of the term "fees" in other statutes enacted in the same year as § 1915(a)(1). Section 1821(a)(1) provides "fees" for any witness "before any person authorized to take his deposition."
88 Congress specifically mandated the United States Marshals to routinely collect "fees" for service of process. 89 Likewise, Congress allowed court reporters to collect "fees" for transcripts. 90 The above statutes all employ a common understanding of the term "fees," and there is no indication that Congress did not intend the same meaning in § 1915(a)(1).
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Two additional considerations point towards a construction allowing judicial discretion to waive fees. First, it would be strange for Congress to authorize the commencement of a civil suit, allocate complimentary service of process at the inception of the suit, transcripts and a printing of record on appeal without the payment of fees, but deny an indigent the ability to marshal the evidence necessary to sustain or succeed in that civil suit. Such a construction is implausible. 92 Second, a construction should generally comport with the statutory purpose. 93 Congress' overarching goal in enacting the IFP statute was to "assure equality of consideration for all litigants" by putting indigents "on a 84 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 38, at 1341. 85 95 Given this purpose, it is difficult to fathom how equality of litigation could be achieved without apportioning the means for indigents to pursue evidence legally necessary to succeed on their claims.
Thus, § 1915(a)(1) should be interpreted to mean that district courts have the ability to waive the witness, service, and court reporter fees associated with depositions. While § 1915(a)(1) permits the waiver of fees, § 1915(d) all but requires it.
B. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) Requires Court Officers to Administer Service and Carry Out Normal Duties and Witnesses to Attend Proceedings Without the Payment of Fees by Indigent Litigants.
The portion of the IFP statute still remaining from the original 1892 version states that "[o]fficers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in such cases. Witnesses shall attend as in other cases, and the same remedies shall be available as are provided for by law in other cases." 96 The question is whether this subsection requires compulsory performance of duties by court officers and compulsory attendance of witnesses, notwithstanding an indigent litigant's inability to pay fees for these services. This is a somewhat different question from whether 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) authorizes a district court to order government payment for court officer and witness fees. My contention is not that § 1915(d) provides government subsidization of deposition fees, but that district courts have authority to waive these fees entirely for indigent litigants. As noted above, every circuit court to address the witness fee issue has ruled to the contrary. 97 But upon close inspection, those decisions prove problematic on a number of levels. First, while the circuits pretended to base their decisions on the plain meaning of the statute, not one actually consulted the words of the 1892 statute or the common, ordinary meaning of those words at the time it was passed-for when interpreting the so-called plain meaning of a statutory provision, the starting point is the plain meaning of the terms in existence at the time the statute was enacted. 105 Like the current witness fee statute, the 1853 Fee Act provided that a witness shall be compensated for appearing in court or before any officer pursuant to law and shall be reimbursed for necessary travel based on mileage. 106 The common practice, at the time, was to tax as costs any fees for services performed by court officers and the attendance of witnesses.
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Given these statutes and common practice, it is clear why Congress added the "shall" language to the IFP statute. Congress was no doubt aware of the fees charged for services and the attendance of witnesses. Since the purpose of the statute was to allow indigent parties to litigate in court without the prepayment of "fees and costs," 108 it would have been antithetical to that purpose for Congress to continue to require fees for court officer services and witness attendance. The phrase "as in other cases" must surely have meant that witnesses were compelled to testify, as in paid cases, regardless of whether the indigent party had tendered fees. No other interpretation of the phrase contained in § 1915(d) matches both the context and plain meaning of the statute at the time it was enacted. 109 Setting the statutory language aside, the strength of the circuit courts' construction can be understood by what practical effect that construction offers. Unfortunately, not one court was able to say what exactly Congress meant when it stated that witnesses shall appear during IFP proceedings, given the fact that fees were charged for such appearances, and indigent litigants were unable to pay those fees. Rather than treat appearances as compulsory, those courts have instead chosen to treat the two sentences as if they are nothing more than mere Congressional suggestion. But that cannot be right, because statutes are "to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant." witnesses' fees and appearances in civil cases, and it must be assumed that Congress had some goal in mind by supplying the "witnesses shall appear" language in the IFP statute. But the circuit courts' construction effectively renders § 1915(d) meaningless, by removing the availability of witnesses for indigent litigants who, by their very definition as paupers, are unable to pay the related fees.
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The circuit courts also confused the chronological history of various amendments to the IFP statute. The Sixth Circuit, for example, held that § 1915(d) "must be read in conjunction with its criminal law counterpart, [28 U.S.C.] § 1825." 112 Since Congress explicitly stated in § 1825 that marshals "shall pay all fees of witnesses," whereas § 1915 merely says that witnesses "shall attend," the Sixth Circuit found this disparate language controlling. 113 But the problem with that rationale is that § 1915(d) was enacted 72 years prior to the enactment of § 1825, 114 and the addition of a specific funding provision in § 1825 does not indicate a repeal of § 1915(d), because the Supreme Court has explained that "repeals by implication are not favored." 115 The Eighth Circuit made the same mistake. The court concluded that the statutory structure of § 1915, which the Eighth Circuit believed Congress passed "as a whole in 1948," compelled the court to hold that § 1915 "does not authorize government payment of witness fees and expenses for indigent litigants."
116 But as noted above, § 1915 was not originally enacted as a whole in 1948 117 ; thus, these later enacted amendments are irrelevant to the original meaning of § 1915(d). For later structural changes "do not declare the meaning of earlier law"; "do not seek to clarify an earlier enacted general term"; "do not depend for their effectiveness upon clarification, or a change in the meaning of an earlier statute"; and "do not reflect any direct focus by Congress upon the meaning of the earlier enacted provisions." 118 Accordingly, the later enactments and new statutory structure should not guide how courts should interpret the earlier provision contained in § 1915(d).
One of the principal reasons the Eighth Circuit came to a contrary construction was by invoking the canon of expressio unius est exclusion alterius. 119 This canon requires that where Congress uses particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, it is generally presumed that Congress has acted intentionally in the disparate inclusion or exclusion. 120 The Means court was convinced that under expressio unius, the specific funding provisions contained in § 1915(c) prohibited the court from inferring additional funding in § 1915(d), absent a clear expression of such intent. 121 This analysis proves awkward given the history of § 1915. 122 The expressio unius canon "does not apply to every statutory listing or grouping; it has force only when the items expressed are members of an 'associated group or series' justifying the inference that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice."
123 Here, had subsection (d) been attached or included in subsection (c), there might have been a role for the canon to play in supporting a conclusion that Congress intended to require payment of witness fees by indigents. But that is not what the statute provides. Subsection (c) sets forth specific examples of expenses that are to be paid by the United States. Subsection (d), on the other hand, sets forth instances of compulsory service by court officers and compulsory attendance of witnesses where no fees are paid by the government or indigent litigants. 124 The specific language in subsection (c) plainly does not imply, much less establish, that Congress expected indigent litigants to pay for service of process, performance of duties by court officers, or the attendance of witnesses. More importantly, resolving the meaning of § 1915(d) by comparing it to § 1915(c) is a senseless exercise, given that subsection (d) was enacted 56 years earlier than subsection (c). 125 Nor can a "new postenactment statutory restructuring" assist in illuminating the intent of an earlier provision. 126 The Mallard Court recognized these well-settled principles in construing § 1915(e) by comparing it only to its 1892 partner, § 1915(d).
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The courts of appeals' decisions interpreting § 1915(d) are also inconsistent. Several circuits have uniformly held that the first sentence of § 1915(d) requires the U.S. Marshals to serve indigents' civil complaints to defendants without regard to fees for service. 128 Nevertheless, those same courts concluded that the next sentence-"witnesses shall attend as in other cases"-is not mandatory unless witness fees are tendered. 129 In other words, the lower courts have interpreted the terms "shall issue and serve all process" and "shall attend," divergently. In doing so, those courts have essentially invented a statute rather than interpreting one. 130 The meaning of § 1915(d) must be consistent, with both compulsory service of court officers and compulsory attendance of witnesses notwithstanding an indigent's payment of fees. 131 The Eighth Circuit also placed reliance on an absence of legislative history for § 1915(d) to support its conclusion that the statute does allow for a waiver of witness fees. 132 Of course, the Eighth Circuit could not find the applicable legislative history because it reviewed the history for 1948, rather than 1892. 133 The 1892 legislative history is informative on the scope of § 1915(d). The House Report acknowledged the primary goal of § 1915 was to solve the problem that "persons with honest claims may be defeated, and doubtless often are, by wealthy adversaries." 134 In an attempt to solve the problem, the Report noted that in cases involving a citizen's liberty, witnesses would be furnished "on demand." 135 During debate on the bill, Representative Stone asked the sponsor of the bill how court officers were to be paid, and whether they were being forced to work for nothing. Representative Culbertson responded:
We are simply in these cases of charity and humanity compelling these officers, all of whom make good salaries, to do this work for Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 46
nothing. That is all the bill does. There may be one such case upon a docket of five hundred; and they are not required to do much ex-officio service.
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Representative Culbertson's statement and the relevant legislative historyfrom 1892, not 1948-provide evidence that the original meaning of § 1915(d) was to allow for waiver of court officer and witness fees.
In construing the statute, the circuits also failed to follow a cardinal rule of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be viewed in their place within the overall statutory scheme. 137 A court must therefore interpret the statute "as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme,"
138 and "fit, if possible, all parts into a harmonious whole." 139 The construction I propose fits most logically and comfortably into both the previously and subsequently enacted IFP statutes. Subsection (a)(1) broadly permits district courts to allow IFP litigants to proceed without the prepayment of fees in certain circumstances. Subsection (c) requires the government to pay certain expenses related to indigent litigation, and subsection (d) mandates certain procedures (such as service and attendance of witnesses) with no payment of fees by anyone. Based upon its plain language, purpose, statutory structure, and history, the statute simply should not be construed to prohibit courts from requiring the attendance of witnesses for depositions or trials without the payment of fees by indigents.
There is an additional justification for construing § 1915 in a manner that affords indigent litigants the means to conduct a deposition: "[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter."
140 Since a contrary interpretation of § 1915 would raise serious equal protection and due process questions, the courts should adopt a construction requiring compulsory service, performance of duties by court officers, and witness attendance, especially in situations where an indigent prisoner's only means of proving his claim is through a deposition sans fees.
In deciding whether a statutory construction is constitutionally doubtful, courts must use the "lowest common denominator" method of interpretation.
141 "In other words, when deciding which of two plausible statutory constructions to adopt, a court must consider the necessary consequences of its choice. If one of them would raise a multitude of constitutional problems, the other should prevail-whether or not those constitutional 143 Griffin involved a state rule that conditioned a criminal appeal on the ability of a defendant to procure a trial transcript and provide it to the appellate court. 144 Although the Court noted that the Constitution does not guarantee the right to appeal, once the state provides such a right, it may not thereafter "bolt the door to equal justice." 145 In declaring the state's rule unconstitutional, the Griffin Court drew support from both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 146 The Court has later expounded on these rights in two lines of cases relevant here.
The Court has long established that prisoners have a due process right of access to the courts. 147 In Johnson v. Avery, for example, the Court invalidated a prison policy that actively interfered with prisoner attempts to prepare habeas corpus motions. 148 The Court later extended the right to include prisoners' ability to file civil rights actions challenging conditions of their confinement. 149 Reasoning that civil rights actions are no less important than habeas corpus writs, the Court felt compelled to extend the right to access.
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In Bounds v. Smith, the Court discussed when the due process right of access is implicated. 151 There the Court was mindful that it had previously "struck down restrictions and required remedial measures to insure that inmates' access to the courts is adequate, effective, and meaningful." 152 Meaningful access in that case required prison officials to supply inmates with law libraries or some comparable form of legal assistance. The relevant inquiry, the Court stated, was whether the procedure at issue was necessary to give Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 46
prisoners a "reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts."
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In another line of cases, the Court has used equal protection analysis to justify providing court access for civil litigants regardless of their ability to pay court fees. The Court in Boddie v. Connecticut held that refusing to allow indigent people to petition for divorce unless they paid the sixty dollar filing fee violated due process. 154 Critical to that decision was the fundamental nature of the right at issue: "[G]iven the basic position of the marriage relationship in this society's hierarchy of values," due process, the Court stated, prohibited "a State from denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek dissolution of marriage." 155 Two years later, the Court clarified when the Constitution requires the waiver of court fees in civil cases. 156 The petitioner in United States v. Kras complained that he could not pay fees totaling fifty dollars to secure a bankruptcy discharge. 157 Although obtaining bankruptcy is momentous, the Court believed that it was not on par with the interest in establishing dissolution of marriage. 158 That same year, the Court, in Ortwein v. Schwab, held the line drawn in Kras. 159 Ortwein concerned a twenty-five dollar fee for court review of agency determinations reducing welfare benefits. There, the Court concluded that the right at issue was not a "fundamental interest," and thus, no waiver of fees was constitutionally mandated. 160 Viewed together, Kras and Ortwein stand for the proposition that the government need not waive court fees when no "fundamental interest" is at stake.
The presence of a fundamental right was crucial to the decision in M.L.B. v. S.L.J. 161 In that case, the petitioner argued that both due process and equal protection mandated a waiver of appellate fees for reviewing terminations of parental rights. Noting that choices about family and children are of the utmost importance in American society, the Court agreed that the Constitution could not allow the state to "bolt the door to equal justice." 162 The Court came to this conclusion in spite of the fact that due process does not demand an appeal for review of parental status, nor the routine appointment of counsel at a parental rights termination hearing. States Code that require fees for witnesses, service of subpoenas, and court reporter transcription, present a serious constitutional rights question when applied to an indigent litigant presenting a valid civil rights claim.
It is important to clarify just what is at stake in cases involving indigent prisoner deliberate indifference claims. An inmate claiming that prison employees failed to treat them or that their medical care was delayed must place " verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect." 164 For many, that is a substantial burden to overcome. 165 Without the means and ability to secure evidence legally necessary to succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim, indigent inmate litigants are effectively shut out from the door of justice.
It is hard to imagine an interest more meaningful than the one at issue here. The ability to seek redress for a violation of one's civil liberties may "offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees."
166 For prisoners, civil rights actions represent the last fundamental political right which is preservative of all rights. Indeed, if there are no means to draw attention to constitutionally improper behavior, prisoners and free citizens alike have lost the last line of defense against constitutional violations. The Supreme Court has found this right so important that it has allowed plaintiffs to sue federal employees for constitutional violations in the absence of statutory authority, through a cause of action directly under the Constitution. 167 A claim that prison officials have been deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need also implicates a fundamental right. The Supreme Court has held that deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs "constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." 168 In fact, the Eighth Amendment-applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment-has long been recognized as a fundamental right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 169 Based on these holdings, there is, at the very least, a serious question whether fee provisions that nullify either of these fundamental rights are constitutionally legitimate. First, the rights at stake here are far more substantial than those in other cases where the Supreme Court required a waiver of fees. 170 Second, without the ability to seek evidence legally necessary to proving their claims, prisoners lack the ability to succeed on their claims of constitutional rights violations, and access to the courts is not "adequate, effective, and meaningful." 171 As one court has stated, "[a] federal law that knocked out prisoners' ability to obtain redress in situations where they are victims of official misconduct, yet lack any non-judicial means to protect themselves, would have to be set aside as unconstitutional under . . . the original meaning of the due process clause." 172 The IFP statute should therefore be interpreted in a manner that avoids these weighty constitutional questions.
Although the traditional approaches to interpreting statutes all lead to the same result, it is clear that the circuit courts based their divergent constructions of the IFP statute in part upon policy concerns that allowing indigent litigants, and especially indigent prisoner litigants, access to free depositions will lead to a massive waste of resources on frivolous claims. The Supreme Court previously raised these policy concerns but also noted that the judiciary's role is "not to make policy, but to interpret a statute." 173 Congress made the policy decision to allow depositions for indigent parties in 1892, and the courts are bound to follow this decision.
Nevertheless, prisoners crafting a deliberate indifference claim under the IFP statute should address courts' policy concerns. Prisoners should first note that the policy considerations underlying the circuit courts' decisions have largely been mitigated by the passage of the PLRA and the discretion afforded judges under the normal rules of civil procedure. To be sure, allowing indigent litigants to conduct depositions sans fees will impose some burdens-for example, district courts will be required to rule upon motions requesting depositions and marshals, and court reporters and witnesses will lose the normal fees generated from services and appearances. But under the PLRA, those burdens will be limited. Indeed, the PLRA allows district courts to dismiss an IFP suit at any time if the judge determines that it "is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 174 The PLRA further requires all inmates to pay filing fees, denies IFP status to prisoners with three or more prior "strikes" unless the prisoner is "under imminent danger of serious physical injury," 175 directs district courts to screen prisoners' complaints before docketing, and permits the rev- 176 Prisoners should contend that these provisions act as robust deterrents for prisoners who consider seeking discovery on frivolous claims.
Moreover, if fees for depositions were waived under § 1915, such a construction would not overly burden the justice system nor tie the hands of judges, who possess wide latitude with regard to discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 26, for example, allows judges to limit the number and length of depositions. 177 In addition, a court may, sua sponte, limit discovery if it is "unreasonably cumulative" or if it could "be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive."
178 Finally, nothing in my proposed construction of § 1915 restricts a court's ability to limit discovery if it determines that the "proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues."
179 In other words, not all indigent litigants would receive a waiver of deposition fees under the proposed construction of § 1915; such discovery requests would be limited by the usual restraints of the PLRA and Federal Rules for those cases where depositions would be wasteful or burdensome.
On the other hand, in truly meritorious cases where the indigent litigant cannot secure the evidence necessary to succeed and that evidence cannot be obtained through another means of discovery, prisoners should contend that judges should exercise the discretion afforded by Congress under § 1915 to waive the fees needed for indigents to conduct depositions. As noted above, such a construction comports with the statute's language, structure, purpose, and history, and it avoids weighty constitutional questions. It also makes sense as a matter of policy.
CONCLUSION
Over the course of ten years, I repeatedly saw the serious medical needs of prisoners utterly disregarded by prison medical staff and administrators. I watched a man with a hernia the size of a softball forced to wait in pain for several months because he was told that his condition was not serious enough to warrant surgery. I watched as a friend living in the cell next to mine developed a deadly form of skin cancer. His treatment was delayed for three months, at the end of which an outside surgeon was forced to cut out huge pieces of flesh from his back to remove the cancer that had spread inward. He barely survived. I also witnessed the ordeal of a friend who broke his wrist during a fall. Once the orthopedic doctor had set the bones, 176 See id. the doctor ordered the prison to X-ray the wrist in a week in order to check that the bones had healed properly. The prison refused, and when my friend saw the orthopedic doctor a month later, he was told that the bones had healed improperly, and the only options were to re-break and re-set the wrist bones or live with impaired function and discomfort.
In each of these examples, the prisoner complained to multiple medical personnel, the warden, and anyone else who would listen. When that proved unfruitful, they filed deliberate indifference claims in federal district court. The judge, in each case, granted summary judgment in favor of the prison because the prisoners were unable, due to a lack of financial resources, to verify their claims through expert evidence.
The vision of Congress, when it passed the IFP statute in 1892, was that indigent litigants would have the same opportunities for justice as those more financially blessed; that notion has not been realized. Because indigent prisoners are unable to afford the cost of entrance, the house of justice remains, in many cases, boarded up. And while there are no quick fixes, courts do possess the ability to pull a board or two down by returning the IFP statute to the meaning originally intended by Congress: that trial courts possess the authority to waive deposition fees for those in desperate need of justice but unable to afford the price.
